Embezzlement through the computer by Cole, Kenneth C.
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Haskins and Sells Publications Deloitte Collection
1970
Embezzlement through the computer
Kenneth C. Cole
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_hs
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Haskins and Sells
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haskins & Sells Selected Papers, 1970, p. 377-389
Embezzlement Through 
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by KENNETH C . COLE 
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Presented at the Western Area Conference of the 
Financial Executives Institute, Seattle—June 1970 
ONE OF T H E MAJOR PROBLEMS of American industry today, embezzle-
ment by employees, is believed to cost U . S . companies at least $3 bil-
lion a year. Theft by employees is estimated at another $1 billion. One 
source has estimated that about 30 per cent of smaller businesses fail be-
cause of employee dishonesty. From all indications, known employee 
crime among companies of all sizes is increasing at the rate of about 15 
per cent a year. 
HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL INVOLVED 
One aspect of the trend is even more disturbing than its size—the 
identity of the people embezzling, stealing, selling corporate secrets, and 
taking bribes. According to some authorities, the bulk of the loss today 
is caused not by the rank and file, but by the managerial class. One 
study indicated that of discovered company frauds in excess of $60 mil-
lion, 62 per cent were committed at the supervisory level or higher. 
Investigators' files are filled with records of executive disloyalty and 
dishonesty. In one recent case, a $300 million-a-year eastern manufactur-
ing company discovered that eleven department heads, each with at least 
twenty years of company service, had been taking kickbacks from sub-
contractors for the past five years. In another recent instance, the head of 
the computer department of a leading credit card company, resentful of 
top management, erased computer tape records storing hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars' worth of accounts receivable. 
COMPUTERS PRESENT NEW PROBLEMS 
Many decades of auditing experience have provided a wealth of 
fraud cases involving manual accounting systems. Auditors use these case 
histories to familiarize themselves with the methods of defrauders. 
Changing technology has created new problems, and the electronic data 
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processing system necessarily forces changes in the methods used by de-
frauders. We cannot wait until a substantial history of actual cases of 
fraud committed in E D P systems has accumulated before studying the 
matter. Attention should be devoted as soon as possible to the problem of 
detecting the possibility of such frauds and of preventing them. 
Effects of EDP Not Recognized 
Suggestions of the possibility of fraud in E D P systems too often have 
been dismissed as being practically impossible for three reasons: (1) 
computers cannot be dishonest; (2) such a fraud would be too complex; 
or (3) internal control procedures prevent the same person from having 
access to valuable assets and to the records of those assets. Many corpo-
rate officers still do not acknowledge the need for additional internal 
controls in computer accounting systems. Recently a professor at the 
Harvard Business School observed a general condition of poor control 
and security in computer operations, even in companies that are well 
managed. This poor control situation can be attributed to a variety of 
reasons, including: 
• The inbred experience of E D P personnel, who are primarily in-
terested in making the machine run; 
• The financial problems of making the proper investment in good 
documentation; and 
• The lack of understanding on the part of non-EDP supervisors 
concerning what the data processing control needs are. 
This lack of controls is odd in view of two conspicuous qualities of com-
puters. On the one hand, computer technology, with its reliable detection 
and recording capabilities, frequently makes possible new and superior 
control techniques. But on the other hand, it appears to provide more 
powerful and sophisticated means of embezzling. Although the account-
ing profession recognized this paradox early and started to develop neces-
sary fraud prevention and detection techniques, their efforts have been 
meeting resistance. 
False Sense of Security 
Apparently the need for well developed controls has not been ac-
knowledged generally because executives have been lulled into a false 
sense of security. Many undoubtedly credit computer accounting systems 
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with a greater resistance to tampering than the facts justify. Others prob-
ably hesitate to require protective measures because of the sheer complex-
ity of the technology. 
Many executives in charge of highly intricate computer systems 
openly admit they haven't the foggiest notion of the nature of this tiger 
they hold by the tail. One administrative v.p. confided that, although 
he is in charge of the E D P Department, if he wants to know what's go-
ing on he has to ask one of the $150-a-week operators. He is praying that 
they are all honest or he could be in an enormous amount of trouble. 
THE RECORD TO DATE 
A leading computer expert at M. I .T . has said that if he were 
a crook, he would work today through computers. 
A n article in a recent Wall Street Journal quoted a prominent data 
processing specialist as saying that he could steal a company blind in 
three months and leave its books looking balanced. His method: electron-
ic embezzlement; his accomplice: the company's own computer. 
Increasingly, business transactions that formerly were recorded on 
ledger pages are being translated into magnetic impulses in a computer's 
memory section. It's a relatively simple matter for a swindler with tech-
nical know-how and a little imagination to program a computer to steal 
from a company. A l l too often corporate executives fail to question the re-
liability of financial results that emerge from complex, million-dollar 
machines. They simply forget that the machines have been built to do 
whatever the operators direct. There's nothing to stop them from work-
ing quite efficiently for the dishonest. 
The head of a large U . S . corporation task force seeking to find meth-
ods of auditing computers used by his company has estimated that many 
companies already have been hit with heavy losses through computer 
embezzlement, but their managements don't know it. He predicts that 
within a few years someone will uncover a computerized embezzlement 
that will make even the most recently publicized swindles seem puny in 
comparison. 
EMBEZZLEMENT CASES REPORTED 
Employee criminality represents a genuine danger in the operation 
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of computer accounting systems. Over the past few years, the press has 
carried a number of reports of specific incidents of such conduct. These 
reports alone should have been sufficient to trigger your serious thinking. 
State Agency 
One day in August 1968 two New York City policemen's suspicions 
were aroused by the nervous manner of four men whose car they had 
stopped for a routine traffic violation. They opened the dash compartment 
and discovered an envelope with about 100 uncashed Neighborhood 
Youth Corps checks. Newspaper readers the next morning read the story 
of how six staff members had systematically milked the antipoverty pro-
ject for nearly a quarter of a million dollars with the help of an unwit-
ting accomplice, a computer. 
Investigators found that a computer had been programmed to issue 
paychecks to hundreds of nonexistent youths, supposedly employed on an 
equally fictitious summer project. Had the scheme gone undetected until 
fall, said authorities, the coded cards representing the phantom work 
force could have been removed, conceivably leaving the computer with 
no memory of the embezzlement and the city without a clue as to how the 
funds had been taken or by whom. 
Stockbrokerage 
To date, one of the largest single losses that has been publicized was 
suffered through the corruption of a computer several years ago when 
one of the most reputable brokerage houses on Wal l Street discovered 
that it had been defrauded of $250,000 by its trusted computer operations 
director. 
The executive simply dropped by the office on Sundays and 
programmed the computers so that corporate funds were siphoned into 
two dummy accounts set up in his name and his wife's. The transfer was 
accomplished so smoothly that it appeared the monies had been used for 
stock purchases. He then made entries indicating sale of the stock sup-
posedly bought and pocketed the cash. 
Sensing something not quite right with the twin accounts, another 
officer of the firm, upon examining them, turned up the irregularities. 
Later, the firm's president stated that the computer executive's system 
was absolutely undetectable. They had no inkling that such a thing was 
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possible and, if the dishonest executive hadn't explained it all later, step 
by step, they probably would still be stumped. 
Wal l Street was still jittery over this computer scandal when a sec-
ond case came to light, this time involving a data processing manager 
who over a four-year period had tapped the till for about $81,000 by in-
structing the computer to issue checks to fictitious payees, all checks be-
ing mailed to his home. His racket might be still flourishing had the 
Post Office not returned one of the phony checks as being "incorrectly ad-
dressed," which aroused the suspicions of a clerk. 
A company spokesman said that they would be foolish to explain the 
details of his scheme unless they wanted someone else to attempt the 
same thing. 
Banking 
Computerized check handling by major banks makes them highly 
vulnerable to these crimes. One publicized swindle of this nature oc-
curred in the Midwest, involving a part-time programmer with cham-
pagne tastes and a beer pocketbook. 
The programmer had been assigned to service the computers of a 
large Minneapolis bank. He immediately opened a special checking ac-
count with the bank in question and inserted a change in the computer 
program that gave the mechanical brain a mental block when confronted 
by one of his checks. The computer would simply pass the checks for pay-
ment despite his insufficient balance. 
This programmer's criminal career ended abruptly a short time later 
when the computer broke down, requiring several days of hand-process-
ing the checks, one a blatant bouncer he had written. A t the time of his 
arrest he had managed to bilk the bank of about $1,300. 
Retailing 
A bright young programmer, who decided he and his friends did 
not have to pay their bills for purchases from the store that employed 
him, simply inserted a routine in the billing program to transfer 
all charges in his own and his friends' accounts to a suspense account, 
which did not appear in detail but was included in the trial-balance to-
tal. This went on until the auditor, using the magnetic tape billing da-
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ta under special routines for confirmation purposes, produced a run list-
ing a substantial unexplained account. 
Service Bureau 
A recent $1 million embezzlement should stir some disquieting 
thoughts for companies that have their data processing done on outside 
computers. 
A service bureau owner in Salinas, California, was sentenced in Jan-
uary 1969 for one to ten years' imprisonment for grand theft and forgery. 
For nearly six years he had embezzled money from clients. Only when 
a small-town bank became suspicious of the size of a check made out to 
a labor organization was he caught and brought to trial. 
The defrauder had used his computer to budget embezzlements so 
easily that within a year he was able to steal $250,000 from a fruit and 
vegetable shipping firm. Apparently he had discovered that the firm had 
no complete audit trail. His next step was to make the company believe 
that the produce was costing more than it actually was, so that opera-
tional costs, profits, and other items stayed in balance. This he managed 
by keeping the balance carefully regulated through having the firm's 
accounting work done at the computer service bureau he had set up in 
the meantime. Here he budgeted just how much he should embezzle dur-
ing a specified period by using both the false and the real data in differ-
ent computer runs and by comparing the results. 
REVEALED INCIDENTS LIKE AN ICEBERG 
The low number of reported incidents is no indication of the true 
extent of the problem. Companies generally are reluctant to publicize in-
cidents that are resolved short of formal legal action, and frequently even 
legal steps are hushed up. The reported experiences do indicate, how-
ever, that serious abuse is possible and that the problem deserves close 
attention at high executive levels. A long time ago, extensive internal 
control techniques had to be established for noncomputer accounting 
methods. Today the introduction of computers has not reduced vulner-
ability to normal dangers. Simple logic supports this fact: The factors 
that encourage criminality are present in both situations—people are in-
volved and substantial ill-gotten gains are possible. In fact, the devices 
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provide new challenges to skilled persons who relish the opportunity to 
beat a system. 
Even with the existence of elaborate internal control techniques, ef-
forts have been made over the years to defraud companies that use non-
computer accounting systems. It would be unthinkable for a company to 
have a traditional accounting system without a wide array of checks and 
controls to prevent and detect fraud and embezzlement by the persons en-
gaged in its operation. Computer systems have many of the same vulner-
abilities and some new ones as well. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude 
that computer accounting systems are not only vulnerable to efforts at 
fraud and embezzlement, but that they will become more so as operators 
and other personnel become more sophisticated about their workings. 
COMPUTER FRAUDS BY EMPLOYEE POSITION 
Any more detailed discussion of frauds in a computer system re-
quires a consideration of exactly who could commit the fraud and how. 
Machine Operator 
Because of the apparent ease with which the machine operator can 
use console intervention, most discussions of fraud in E D P systems have 
been concerned with fraudulent action by him. 
Normally the machine operator would have access to cash when 
checks are the input or output of the computer, such as in banking oper-
ations and disbursement routines. If the machine operator diverted a 
check, he could attempt to conceal the act by entering a false transaction 
via the console, or by inserting a transaction by forging a source docu-
ment that would become the basis for input preparation, or by preparing 
the machine-readable input himself. Obviously, all of these frauds re-
quire a detailed knowledge of the computer program, and a program-
ming fraud would require the ability to program. Thus, the greatest 
danger of fraud in a computer system exists where there is only one sys-
tems specialist who is at once the operator, programmer, and system de-
signer. In smaller installations this would be the familiar situation of 
inadequate separation of duties. The same problem would exist where 
the machine operator had detailed knowledge of programs and had the 
ability to program. This situation also exists in some companies even 
where it is not required by a shortage of personnel. 
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Although limiting the machine operator's knowledge of detailed 
programs is a preventive internal control procedure, there are positive 
measures that help to detect irregular action. A console log would pro-
vide a record of computer utilization, the nature of stoppages, and sum-
maries of errors or program changes that required operator intervention. 
Some control must be maintained over these console print-outs, such 
as a locked copy of the print-out or prenumbered sheets. In addition, this 
console log must be reviewed by a knowledgeable independent party. 
Without proper review of the console log, there is no effective control. 
A comparison of the actual time used with budgeted operating time, 
with variations investigated, would provide improved control. Any oper-
ator intervention would cause a substantial delay in processing that a re-
view would detect. This control, however, could easily break down un-
less coupled with another preventive measure. There must be a standard 
procedure for each type of error that would cause a "halt" during proces-
sing. The operator's instructions in these circumstances should specifi-
cally indicate the error-correction procedures to be followed. The time 
and freedom available to the operator in the absence of written error 
routine instructions is a definite opening for fraud. 
Programming fraud 
A n unusual example of a programming fraud illustrates the inge-
nuity of some of these people. This fraud took place in a bank and was 
committed by a machine operator. Ordinarily, operators did not have de-
tailed knowledge of the computer programs, but this one was self-edu-
cated. B y studying the program run book, he became familiar with the 
detailed computer instructions of the savings-account interest program 
that he wished to change. Thus, although the organizational plan limit-
ed the programming knowledge of operators, there was nothing to pre-
vent the operators from gaining that knowledge on their own. The con-
trol system did not permit any opportunities for the operator to insert the 
fraudulent subroutine into the program for calculating and posting inter-
est income to savings accounts, so the operator again used his ingenuity. 
He purchased processing time at a computer service center and, with 
the addition of a fraudulent subroutine, duplicated the bank's interest 
program. Each savings account was credited with interest income as nor-
mally calculated, reduced by one dollar. These dollars were accumu-
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lated and credited to the operator's account. The operator then carried 
the tape reel containing this fraudulent program into the computer room. 
A m i d the confusion of processing deadlines, he insisted that the tape 
reel he had was the correct one and received little argument. 
Input alteration 
The machine operator can also cause an error by intentionally in-
serting a flaw in the input. One such fraud was committed by the mana-
ger of a cooperative computer center. The computer center manager in-
serted a "read flaw" on checks he wished to convert. Consequently, the 
altered checks were rejected during the entry run and were held for man-
ual processing. The manager subsequently converted the checks to his 
own use. Although he did not change the computer system itself, the 
manager's actions placed chosen input documents in a vulnerable 
position. 
The most obvious internal control procedure that would detect such 
an input alteration is the batch-control technique. Using this technique, 
a count of input documents is made when they are originally prepared, 
and this control total is compared with totals taken in various stages of 
processing. This procedure will not be effective unless there is positive 
follow-up and correction of detected differences. Unfortunately, there 
may be frequent differences between the original count and subsequent 
machine counts because of human error made in the first count. In this 
case, inadequate follow-up frequently results when differences due to 
faulty original count become a common occurrence. In addition, if a 
fraudulent input document is substituted for a legitimate input document 
rather than being merely added to the batch, the batch-control tech-
nique would not be effective. Unless input documents are prenumbered 
and accounted for, such substitution would be relatively easy. 
Programmer 
The programmers have detailed knowledge of computer operation 
and programming and would have the knowledge and ability to commit a 
programming fraud. If many programmers participate in the installation 
of a computer system, a fraudulent subroutine in the original program 
is unlikely since, with several people participating, the "debugging" of 
new programs would uncover the scheme. Since there are frequent alter-
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ations of programs to adapt them to changing conditions, however, a 
fraudulent program change after the "debugging" is quite possible. A 
programmer would possess the knowledge necessary to make an un-
authorized program change. He could also forge approval of a fraudulent 
program change. He could possibly add a fraudulent subroutine to a 
legitimately approved program change. 
Internal control procedures aimed at preventing a fraudulent pro-
gram change include requiring all program changes to be cleared 
through a person of authority other than through the programmer, docu-
mentation of the reason and effect of all program changes, and numerical 
accountability of change of program authorizations. If unauthorized 
changes are to be avoided, numerical accountability of change of pro-
gram authorization is a necessity. 
Programmers could also insert a fraudulent transaction into the rec-
ords. Depending on the circumstances, either console intervention or al-
teration of input might be used to achieve this end." 
A n internal control procedure that could prevent alteration of the in-
put or console intervention by the programmer is the organizational sep-
aration of the computer center and the systems and programming unit. 
In other words, programmers should be denied access to machine opera-
tions. Collusion between the programmer and the machine operator 
would combine the physical access to the records of the machine operator 
with the detailed knowledge of the system possessed by the programmer. 
The possibility of collusion would actually be the same as in a manual 
system. 
Involuntary collusion 
There is, however, a possibility of involuntary collusion that has as-
pects unique to a computer system. The machine operator might become 
the unknowing partner of a programmer in a fraud. If the machine opera-
tor has limited knowledge of programming and accounting matters, the 
programmer could give the operator instructions that would insert a 
fraudulent subroutine into the program or insert a fraudulent transaction 
into the data being processed. Insertion of a fraudulent transaction is 
particularly possible if the operator contacts the programmer when an 
error is detected during processing. Unless there is an established error 
routine procedure, the operator, by following the programmer's instruc-
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tions, might allow the programmer access to the computer and to the 
records when a "halt" due to an error occurs. To avoid the possibility 
of involuntary collusion, the operators should be instructed not to accept 
instructions from programmers. Program documentation should not pro-
vide for instructions such as "See programmer in case of halt." 
Systems Supervisor 
The inherent authority in any supervisory position makes fraud and 
embezzlement easier. For a systems supervisor, the centralization in a 
computer system accentuates this problem. Combined with the know-
ledge and ability to make fraudulent program changes, the systems super-
visor frequently has the authority to initiate such changes. 
The most effective control for detecting a fraud by the systems su-
pervisor is output sampling. A control group independent of the Data 
Processing Department would make an intensive verification of output 
on a sample basis. While this method would not detect all frauds, 
it would have a deterrent effect. 
SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD 
Programming fraud will become a much more serious problem as 
authorization and approval for routine tasks become incorporated in the 
computer system. There have been suggestions that such decisions as 
writing off delinquent accounts, authorizing returns and allowances, ap-
proving invoices and preparing checks, reordering stock, and granting 
credit could be programmed into the computer. Writ ing off accounts re-
ceivable and reducing receivables for returns and allowances have been 
used in frauds and for concealment of defalcations. Putting authorization 
and approval of such decisions in the computer program means putting 
these decisions within the control of the personnel that control the 
program. 
Manipulation of Master Records 
The opportunities to change master records of many kinds deserve 
special mention. While such files as payroll, customer accounts receiv-
able, and accounts payable were easily controllable when on ledger cards 
or the like, their transfer to computer device storage exposes them to ac-
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cess by almost anyone in the E D P operation who can gain access to the 
programs, the magnetic tapes or disks, and a computer system. 
The physical controls over these files must be tight. The authoriza-
tions for changes to master file information must be specifically assigned 
and always required. The computer programs that provide for changes to 
the master files should provide for printing a report showing: the master 
record before the change; the change made; and the master record after 
the change. This report should be closely controlled and forwarded to 
management personnel who can assess the propriety of the changes. 
Departments initiating the changes should be furnished a copy of 
the report so they may determine whether the requested changes, and no 
others, were made. 
Serious gaps in controls over master record changes have been noted 
in many installations, and this area affords an outstanding opportunity 
for fraud and embezzlement. 
SUMMARY 
It is continually amazing to note the sizable investment that many 
companies make in reaching a decision concerning computer feasibility, 
and then devote minimum, even token, attention to assuring that someone 
isn't siphoning off the assets by using the computer once it is installed. 
Unless the necessary controls are installed, the considerable time and ef-
fort devoted to determining the most suitable make, model, and color of 
computer hardware to be ordered, and the nature of the applications to 
be converted can constitute a great service to a potential embezzler by fur-
nishing him the best system with which to achieve his objectives. 
I am always suspicious of an E D P department that is "all loused 
up." The easiest way to steal in a data processing department is to do so 
poor a job that any possibility of fraud can be explained away as ineffi-
ciency or poor judgment. It seems to me that the easiest way to steal is 
purposely to develop a climate of chaos and then take advantage of it. 
Over-all reviews of internal controls in the computer function must 
be thorough, well planned, regularly scheduled, and supplemented with 
special reviews as additional applications are converted. Additionally, pe-
riodic unannounced audits should be made. 
The review must go far beyond mere questioning of the E D P man-
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ager about whether such and such controls have been established and are 
in effect. The controls must be tested—tested by someone outside the 
computer function. One of the commonest control deficiencies found is 
that the controls described did not actually exist. Although management 
was assured that they were established, there were so many exceptions 
and so much laxity in their enforcement that they proved virtually 
worthless. 
I am sure that many top management personnel are familiar with 
the matters discussed here and already have recognized to one degree or 
another the need to have these types of controls. But I will risk a good-
sized wager that only a handful have a program for testing whether or 
not the controls described in the procedure manuals and job descriptions 
actually are being followed. 
I strongly urge members of top management to take it upon them-
selves to obtain satisfactory assurance that the controls in the E D P func-
tion are suitably prescribed and actually are in effect. Test the system by 
attempting to put through inconsistent, unauthorized, or false transac-
tions, or ask someone else to do so. Ask someone with whom E D P per-
sonnel are not familiar to try walking into the computer room and pick-
ing up reports, magnetic tapes, and programs. Test the follow-up over 
error listings and console typewriter messages. 
In my view, the prime security measure in an E D P situation is an 
alert and informed management outside the E D P department. Manage-
ment that is not informed on E D P control matters is at the mercy of their 
data processing manager, and those who fall in that category should un-
derstand this very clearly. If management does not understand E D P 
and cannot assess the controls surrounding that operation, or if they 
cannot take the time to do so, then they should obtain outside expert 
advice of persons who can perform this critical review and test function. 
I hope that this discussion has contributed to a greater awareness of 
the risks involved in the E D P function and that you may feel prompted 
to test the presumed controls in your organization. In this way you may 
avoid appearing in future Wall Street Journal headlines that proclaim 
the sordid details of one of the major computerized embezzlements pre-
dicted by the experts. 
